大股东股权质押与企业创新

Stock Pledge of Large Shareholder and Innovation

选取2006—2014年中国制造业上市公司的相关数据资料,研究了控股股东股权质押对企业创新活动的影响。股权质押是股东面临资金缺口,存在较强融资约束的重要信号。研究发现:(1)控股股东股权质押与企业研发投入之间显著负相关;(2)金字塔控制层级越长,控股股东股权质押与企业研发投入之间的负向关系越显著;(3)在其他大股东股权质押的情况下,控股股东股权质押与企业研发投入之间的负向关系越显著。本文从委托代理角度不仅揭示了控股股东股权质押对企业研发投入的影响机制,也为加强投资者保护提供了经验证据。

Using data of Chinese industry listed firms from 2006 to 2014,this paper examines the impact of stock pledge on enterprise innovation. Stock pledge is the signal of shareholders’ financial constraints. This study finds：（ 1） Stock pledge of controlling shareholder has a negative effect on enterprise innovation input;（ 2） The layer of pyramid structure will intensify the negative effective between stock pledge and innovation input;（ 3） Stock pledge of other large shareholders will intensify the negative effective between stock pledge and innovation input. From the perspective of agency theory,this paper not only reveals the stock pledge influence mechanism on enterprise innovation input,but also provides empirical evidence for enhancing investor protection.