政府干预、终极控制权与企业雇佣行为——基于中国民营上市公司的研究

Government Intervention,Ultimate Control Right and Enterprise Employment Behavior:Research Based on Chinese Private Listed Companies

文章基于中国民营企业控制权结构下的地方政府干预动机,利用中国民营上市公司的经验数据,从理论和实证两个层面系统研究了政府干预对民营上市公司雇佣行为的影响和控股股东控制权对政府这种干预行为的影响及其经济后果。结果发现:(1)控股股东的控制权会调节政府干预与民营企业雇员规模之间的关系,在控股股东控制权较大的民营企业中,交易成本或谈判成本更低,政府干预能够显著提高企业的雇员规模。(2)这种干预行为降低了民营企业雇员的配置效率,导致了企业劳动力成本的上升,也提高了雇员冗余的程度。文章研究在一定程度上为进一步了解地方政府对企业的干预机制提供了理论依据和决策参考。

Based on local government intervention motive under the control structure of Chinese private enterprises,this paper uses the empirical data of private listed companies to systematically explore the effect of government intervention on private listed companies＇ employment behaviors,and the role of control rights of controlling shareholders in this intervention process economic consequences at theoretical and empirical levels.It comes to the following conclusions：firstly,control rights of controlling shareholders moderate the relationship between government intervention and staff size of private enterprises,and in private enterprises with large controlling rights of controlling shareholders,government intervention could significantly increase the staff size because of low transaction costs or negotiation costs;secondly,this kind of government intervention reduces the efficiency of the employee allocation,leading to the increase in labor costs and the degree of employee redundancy.It provides theoretical basis and decision reference for further understanding of local government intervention on enterprises to some extent.