分析师商业性动机与盈余预测偏差:来自融资融券的证据

Analysts' Commercial Motivations and Earnings Forecast Bias:Evidence from Margin Transactions

证券分析师是否会为了商业性目的而牺牲专业性?文章利用融资融券制度检验了鼓励交易动机是否会导致分析师有意提供偏颇的股票分析报告。卖空交易使股票在下跌过程中也能增加交易佣金,促使证券分析师给出更加客观的盈余预测。文章采用经过股票价格调整的盈余预测误差绝对值,作为分析师盈余预测偏差的度量指标,发现相对于存在卖空限制的股票,分析师对融资融券标的股票的短期盈余预测偏差降低了约0.014,长期盈余预测偏差降低了约0.019,但平均月度换手率上升了约10.9%。公司业绩和盈余预测难度的变化不能解释这一现象。文章研究表明,鼓励交易动机会使分析师发布更加乐观的盈余预测报告,而允许卖空有助于矫正这种商业性动机,增强分析师的专业性。

Will the securities analysts sacrifice professionalism for commercial purpose？This paper uses the margin transactions institution to test whether the analysts intentionally provide biased stock analysis reports for the purpose of encouraging stock transactions.Short selling can increase trading commissions in the process of stock price falling and lead to more objective earnings forecasts by securities analysts.This paper uses the absolute value of earnings forecast error divided by stock prices to evaluate earnings forecast bias,and suggests that compared with stocks with short-sale constraint,shortterm earnings forecast bias of margin trading stocks reduces by about 0.014 and long-term earnings forecast bias by about 0.019,but the average monthly turnover rate increases by about 10.9%.The changes in corporate performance and earnings forecast difficulty cannot explain this phenomenon.It shows that trading incentives have led analysts to provide more optimistic earnings forecast reports,and margin transactions institution can help correct analysts＇ commercial motivation and enhance their professionalism.