惩罚型法律调控作用的数理表达与检验

Mathematical Express and Empirical Test for Penalty-Type Legal Regulatory Effects

文章基于广义期望效用理论推导出的数学定理表明,惩罚型法律调控能够通过增加违法成本和提高处罚力度的方式,有效降低理性行为人选择违法行为的概率,提高合法行为收益与降低违法行为收益会对理性主体效用产生同样的影响。探讨了合法行为收益差距对理性主体行为选择的影响,发现收益差距的扩大会提高理性主体选择违法行为的概率,且这种效应对低收入群体最为明显,通过立法司法方式降低收入差距能有效地控制违法犯罪数量。

Mathematical theorems deduced from the expected utility theory suggests that the penalty-type legal regulation and control can reduce the probability of rational people＇ s illegal behavior through increasing illegal cost and punishment intensi- ty, and that increasing legitimate profits will exert the same influence on rational people＇ s utility as decreasing illegal profits, on the basis of which this paper makes a further study to discuss the influence that lawful behavior profits gap produces on the ratio- nal people＇ s behavior choices. The study shows us that the profits gap expansion increases the probability of rational people choosing illegal behavior, and furthermore, such an effect is most significant among the low-income people, and that illegal and criminal activities can be reduced through legislation and judicial approaches.