摘要
马里翁先生在其近作《论笛卡尔的受动性思想》中认为笛卡尔的"吾身"概念是《第六沉思》的一条暗线,有助于最终赢回一开始受到怀疑的外部世界,不过,当他把"吾身"等同于"肉"这一当代现象学的新宠时,又不可避免地引起了一些争议。我们发现,《第六沉思》中的一个文本恰恰可以把"吾身"视为"肉"的前提,从而进一步支持马里翁先生的上述观点。
In his recent book,Sur la pensée passive de Descartes,Marion suggests that Descartes' concept of meum corpus in the sixth Meditation is a hint to help regain the outside world,which is doubted at first sight. However,when he equates the concept of meum corpus with 'flesh',which is a new concept in contemporary phenomenology,it would inevitably cause several disputes. In this paper we find that,a text in the sixth Meditation is the right reason that could take meum corpus as 'flesh',which would be seen as a support to Marion's philosophical stance.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期67-74,共8页
World Philosophy