非对称信息下制造商低碳技术投资决策研究

Research on Manufacturers' Investment in Low-carbon Technology Decision Under Asymmetric Information

低碳经济下,制造商和零售商对消费者低碳偏好的信息掌握情况将对供应链决策产生重大影响。针对不同信息条件下供应链中制造商的低碳技术投资问题,建立了制造商与销售商利润函数。基于二级供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了消费者低碳偏好信息对称和不对称2种情景下供应链企业的定价决策,以及制造商对消费者低碳偏好信息掌握的不确定性程度对供应链企业及整体利润的影响。最后进行了算例分析与模型验证,得到对称与非对称信息下制造商低碳投入的最优定价策略。结果表明,非对称信息下,制造商由于缺乏消费者低碳偏好的准确信息,收益具有不确定性,因此,制造商会采取激励措施积极与销售商合作。

In the era of low-carbon economy,the information of the consumer’s preference that manufacturers and retailers get has a significant impact on the decision-making of supply chain. Aiming at the problem of the low-carbon technique investment under different information conditions for manufacturers,the profit functions of the manufacturer and distributor are established. The pricing decision strategy made by the supply chain enterprises under symmetric information and asymmetric information on consumers’ preference is analyzed for low carbon products. Furthermore,the effects of asymmetric information on consumers’ preference for low carbon products on profits of both the enterprises and the overall supply chain are analyzed by the Stackelberg model of a two-stage supply chain. At last,a case analysis and model verification are carried out to obtain the optimal pricing strategy of manufacturers’ low-carbon investment under symmetric and asymmetric information. The results show that under the asymmetric information,due to the lack of accurate information about the low carbon preference of the consumer,the profit becomes uncertain,so the manufacturer will take the incentive to cooperate with the seller actively.