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基于区域分割技术的硬件木马检测方法 被引量:1

A Hardware Trojan Detection Method Based on Region Segmentation Technology
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摘要 提出了一种基于区域分割技术的硬件木马检测方法,通过电路设计和检测相结合的方式,在电路内植入能生成多种测试向量的自测试模块,且不同测试向量可使目标区域电路内部节点在工作时具有高、低翻转率的差异,采用区域独立供电网络设计及门控时钟控制区域分时工作等方法,提高由硬件木马产生的侧信道数据在整体电路侧信道数据中所占的比重,使含有硬件木马电路的侧信道数据与正常数据差异明显,从而更易于鉴别隐藏于电路中的硬件木马。仿真测试结果表明,本方法最高可检测出占总体电路规模0.3%的时序逻辑型硬件木马,与传统的硬件木马检测方式相比,明显提高了硬件木马检测的分辨率。 Based on the region segmentation technique, a hardware Trojan detection method was presented. Through the combination of the circuit design and detection method, the self-test module which could generate multiple test vectors was implanted into the circuit. Different test vectors are designed to change the switching-activity of the circuit nodes. By using the methods of regionally independent power supply network design and the time-sharing work of the areas under the gated clock control, the proportion of the side-channel data generated by the hardware Trojan in the overall circuit side-channel data was in- creased in order that the side-channel data of the circuit with hardware Trojan was obviously different with the normal data. Thus, the hardware Trojan hiding in the circuit could be detected much more easily. The simulation tests results show that this method can identify the timing-logic hardware Trojan which occupies at least 0. 3% of the total circuit size, so that the detection resolution of the hardware Trojan is greatly improved by this method compared with the traditional hardware Trojan detection method.
出处 《半导体技术》 CSCD 北大核心 2017年第7期555-560,共6页 Semiconductor Technology
关键词 硬件木马 区域分割 电源隔离 门控时钟 侧信道分析 hardware Trojan region segmentation power isolation gated clock side-channel analysis
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