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上市公司定向增发与高管自利行为

Private placement and self-interested behavior of executives in listed companies
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摘要 采用事件研究法和多元回归模型对57个样本研究结果显示,高管参与的定向增发会增加股东财富,产生正的累积超额收益;高管权利的大小和定向增发与高管产生自利行为动机的强弱呈正比,并且高管所占定向增发份额比例与股东累计超额收益率变化幅度呈反比。 With Empirical Study and multiple regression model,57 sampling are collected to discuss the private placement and self-interested behavior in the listed companies.The results indicate that private place orientated by executives would increase shareholder wealth and positive cumulative excess income would produced;the power of the executives is proportional to the self-interest motivation;and the private placement share proportion is inversely proportional to the variation of cumulative excess return of shareholders.
出处 《长春工业大学学报》 CAS 2017年第3期303-307,共5页 Journal of Changchun University of Technology
关键词 定向增发 自利行为 高管权利 超额收益 private placement self interested behavior executive power excess return
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