不同关系港口间的博弈

Game between ports with different relationships

为研究港口间存在的领导-追随、竞争-竞争、合作-合作和合作-竞争等多种关系对港口吞吐量和收益的影响,构建博弈模型分析比较不同关系下的港口的吞吐量和收益.研究结果表明:(1)对于处于领导地位的港口而言,在领导-追随关系下的收益和吞吐量大于在竞争-竞争关系下的吞吐量和收益;对处于追随地位的港口而言,情况恰好相反.(2)在主从关系中,虽然处于领导地位的港口有较大的先发优势,但港口双方也有合作的积极性.由于背叛行为可能会出现,政府应该加强对港口的监管.

In order to study the effects of relationships between ports,such as leader-follower,competition-competition,cooperation-cooperation and cooperation-competition,on port throughput and revenue,a game model is constructed to analyze throughput and revenue for ports with different relationships. The results show：（ 1） For the ports as leaders,the throughput and revenue in the leader-follower relationship are higher than those in the competition-competition relationship; for the ports as followers,the situation is the opposite.（ 2） For the two ports in the leader-follower relationship,although the port as a leader enjoys substantial first-mover advantages,the two ports have the enthusiasm of cooperation. Due to the probability of betrayal behaviors existing,the government should strengthen port supervision.