政府反腐力度与养廉薪酬计划设计——基于动态离散选择模型的分析

The Government's Anti-corruption Efforts and the Design of “Keeping Incorruptibility” Compensation Plan:An Analysis Based on Dynamic Discrete Choice Model

腐败行为不仅是一种社会历史现象,也是一个跨越社会制度的世界性痼疾。在理性经济人假设下,根据委托—代理理论设计科学的激励机制有助于防范和治理腐败问题。通过建立动态离散选择模型,分析了政府查处腐败行为的力度对养廉薪酬水平的影响。并且基于对中国贪腐案件的实证与模拟分析,发现政府反腐力度是"以薪养廉"的基础,只有设计合理递增的薪酬计划,才可能起到"反腐倡廉"的效果。另外,养廉薪酬计划设计不仅要充分考虑公职人员的学历、职级及其任职期限等因素的影响,同时也要实现与经济政策变量(贴现率)的联动。

Corruption is not only a social and historical phenomenon, but also a worldwide problem across the social system. On the premise of rational person scientific and incentive mechanism can be designed to prevent and control corruption with the help of the principal-agent theory. This paper establishes the dynamic discrete choice model to analyze the influence on the ＂ probity salary system＂ from the anti-corruption efforts. Based on empirical and simulation analysis on Chinese corruption cases, paper finds that Chinese governments＂ hardworking on anti--corruption is one important prerequisite for ＂probity salary system＂, and a compensation plan which could play a significant role in combating corruption and advocating honest must be both incremental and reasonable. In addition, when designing an accepetable plan on reward for honest while paying attention on the effects from education background, rank and tenure of civil servants, the economic policy variables （discount rate） should be also taken into account.