食品安全监管责任者的激励机制分析

An Analysis of Incentive Mechanism of Supervisory Responsibility for Food Safety

目前单一的、非定量的、只对出现重大食品安全事件进行问责的"一票否决式"食品安全监管激励制度不足以激发监管者对食品安全实施充分监管,导致食品安全监管陷入了层级委托代理问题困境之中。而要想进一步提高地方政府食品安全规制的努力程度,必须以可量化的形式把食品安全规制绩效加入到地方政府官员的政绩考核中。本文提出了考核地方政府食品安全规制绩效的5个指标:地方政府查处的食品安全事件数目、食品质量抽检合格率、绿色有机食品的相对数目及增长率和研发出新的食品安全风险因素检测方法数目等。并对如何激励各级监管人员进行了分析。

At present, the simplex, non-quantitative, ＂one vote of veto＂ on occurrence of major food safety incident of food safety supervision incentive system is inadequate to prompt the regulators to moni- tor food safety adequately, which leads food safety supervision has fallen into the dilemma of hierarchical principal-agent problem. In order to further improve the efforts of local government food safety regulation, it is necessary to add food safety regulation performance into political achievement evaluation of local gov- ernment in a quantifiable form. Five indexes to evaluate achievement of local government＇s food safety reg- ulation are put forward： number of food safety incidents investigated by local governments, qualified rate of food quality sampling inspection, relative number and increasing rate of green organic foods and research and development of new method detecting food safety risk factors. The author also analyzes the ways to motivate supervisors at all levels.