企业政治关联与跨国并购绩效——基于中国并购方数据

The Political Connection of Enterprises and Cross-border M&A Performance—Based on Chinese Acquirers' Database

本文以2001—2013年中国海外并购企业为样本,研究中国企业政治关联对其跨国并购绩效的影响。结果发现,并购方政治关联度与其跨国并购绩效的关系会受到政府干预度的影响,即当并购方政治关联度一定时,政府干预度越高,其跨国并购绩效越低。同时,优惠贷款作为重要途径之一,也能让政治关联度对并购绩效产生影响,在海外投资中,具有融资便利的企业往往存在盲目性,并且能够对并购绩效产生比较不利的影响。利用Blinder-Oaxaca分解方法,发现尽管中国在海外的并购数量不断上升,但是绩效却呈现不升反降的趋势。虽然人民币升值助力并购绩效的提升,但是政治干预度、贷款比率的变动、并购方资产规模均导致了并购绩效的下降。

This paper studies the impact of political connections of Chinese enterprises on cross-border MA performance,through China＇s overseas MA firm-level from 2001 to 2013. The results show that the relationship between the acquirers＇ political relevance and cross-border MA performances will be affected by the degree of government intervention. When acquirers＇ political connections maintain unchanged,the stronger the government intervenes,the lower the cross-border MA performances. Meanwhile,preferential loans can also affect the political relevance on the MA performance; since enterprises with financing facilities in the overseas investment are always blind which can have relatively adverse effect on MA performance. Using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method,this paper finds that the crossborder MA performance is decreasing with the increasing number of MA abroad. While the appreciation of the RMB improves MA performance,the degree of political interference,the change of the loan rate and the asset size of the acquiring party have all led to a decline in MA performance.