国有企业高管在职消费监管:理论与经验证据

Supervising Perquisite Consumption of Executives in State-owned Companies:Theory and Evidence

新一轮国有企业改革中对高管在职消费的监管是难点之一,本文从理论和经验上为其提供了支持。在中国,在职消费被认为是企业高管的一种重要替代激励,但其激励效应究竟怎样?为什么要加强监管?本文从契约的非正式履约机制角度进行分析,指出在职消费是高管通过与所有者达成关系契约而形成的一种非正式激励,关系契约的自我履约性和不能被第三方证实的特点导致其激励水平高但激励效应弱。随后本文以中国上市公司为样本,使用针对动态面板数据的系统广义矩估计法(sys-CMM),验证了在职消费的这种弱激励效应。

Supervising perquisite consumption of executives in state-owned companies during the new round of reform is of especial importance,which is supported theoretically and empirically in this paper.Perquisite consumption is taken as an important alternative incentive of monetary compensation in Chinese companies.However,how actually is the incentive effect and why should the supervision be tightened？ This paper,from the perspective of informal enforcement of contract,proposes a new theoretical explanation that perquisite consumption is informal an incentive realized through relational contract between owners and management.Features of self-enforcement and unverification by the third party result in high level perquisite consumption with weak incentive effect.Afterwards,this paper uses the data of listed companies in China to test the weak incentive effect of perquisite consumption with systematic generalized method of moments,which further proves the hypothesis.