基于内部绩效与市场价值的国有企业高管薪酬管控

Executives' Salary Control of State-owned Enterprises Based on Internal Performance and Market Value

本文以A股上市公司为样本数据,运用因子分析法构建企业内部绩效综合指标和企业市场价值综合指标,将高管薪酬与综合指标相结合,构成与企业业绩相联系的业绩薪酬指标,然后将国有企业与非国有企业的业绩薪酬指标进行对比,实证检验国有企业高管薪酬管控的必要性。同时,本文认为国有企业高管薪酬管控应参考高管为企业创造的市场价值,企业实际经营状况与市场估值差距越大,则国有企业高管经营成果与市场预期差距越大,通过构建企业内部绩效和市场价值对高管薪酬影响的模型,发现企业市场价值对高管薪酬有负向影响,进而可以以企业市场价值作为高管薪酬管控的参考依据。

By designing the comprehensive indexes of internal performance and market value with the factor analysis method based on A-share listed companies＇ data,this paper combines the executives＇ salary index with the comprehensive index to create a performance-salary index.Next,by comparing the comprehensive index between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,it concludes that it is necessary to control salary in state-owned enterprises.Then,the salary control should accord with the market value created by executives.If the difference between the actual operating results and market valuation is large,the gap between the result of executive operation and market expectation will be big.By constructing the model of which internal performance and market value influence executive salary,this paper concludes that market value has a negative effect on executive salary,so market value index can be an instruction for salary controlling.