摘要
在市场失灵和国有企业失灵"双重"失灵的背景下,发展混合所有制就是要利用混合所有制的制度优势提高国有企业效率,深化国有企业改革。然而,混合所有制并不是完全的,制度的路径依赖和"搭便车"的冲动使国有、私有两种所有制在控制权博弈中,同样存在失灵的风险。本文通过论述混合所有制的内涵、优势和问题,结合单一所有制失灵的原因及影响,在控制权博弈模型分析的基础上,探索混合所有制失灵的原因及影响,进而提出积极发展混合所有制的政府管制举措。
Faced with the ＂double failure＂ of both the market and state-owned enterprises,it is crucial to take the institutional advantage to develop mixed ownership,so as to improve the efficiency and advance the reform of state-owned enterprises.However,mixed ownership does not count for all.It is the path-dependence for institution and ＂free-riding＂ impulse that make both state-owned and private-owned enterprises share die same risk of failure in the game of control.Combined with the causes and effects of single ownership failure,this paper discusses the connotation,advantage and problems＇ of mixed ownership,and tries to find the reason and influence of mixed ownership failure based on analysing the control power game model,to propose the government regulation path and institutional suggestions for die development of mixed ownership.
作者
汤吉军
刘仲仪
TANG Jijun LIU Zhongyi(Jilin University, Changchun 130012)
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第12期82-89,共8页
Research on Economics and Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目"推进经济结构战略性调整研究"(13&ZD022)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持项目"交易成本
沉淀成本与政府反垄断问题研究"(NCET-13-0247)
吉林大学985工程青年学术领袖项目"国有企业治理结构的路径依赖及其超越"(2015FRLX09)
关键词
混合所有制
国有产权
私有产权
政府管制
mixed ownership
state-owned enterprise
private ownership
government regulation
