和乎? 战乎?——卢沟桥事件中蒋介石的决策过程

Peace or War?——Chiang Kai-shek's Decision-making Process during July 7 Incident

卢沟桥事件发生之初,中日双方都面临着和还是战的选择,也都曾有过不扩大事态的决定,但终究还是走上了战争之路。在重新梳理史料的基础上,本文认为,虽然许多人梦想在这个仲夏之夜收割他们盼望已久的果实,但就中日两国的未来而言,时间在中国一边,和平于中国有利。事件发生后,蒋介石并非"立即下了抗战的决心",其抗战决策也经历了从在和与战之间摇摆到丢弃幻想的过程;7月17日庐山谈话的真实目的是向"倭王"裕仁喊话,期望收到阻止全面战争的奇效。

At the beginning of the Lugouqiao Incident, China and Japan were faced with the same choice ： peace or war？ Both once hoped to avoid escalation of the situation ; later, however, the war broke out. This paper concludes that people believed that it would be beneficial to China if peace could be maintained. After the July 7 Incident occurred, Chiang Kai-shek did not ＂make up his mind at once to start the anti-Japanese war＂, and his resistance war decision-making experienced a transition, from first swinging between peace and war then to discarding the illusion of peace. Chiang＇ s Lushan Announcement on July 17, 1937 was meant to address to the Japanese Emperor Hirohito, with the fanciful wish to avoid a full-scale war.