批发价格与收益共享合约并存下的供应链信息泄露研究

Information Leakage in Supply Chain with Co-existence of Wholesale Price Contract and Revenue Sharing Contract

信息泄露是供应链企业之间进行信息共享的障碍之一,本文考虑供应商与在位者零售商、进入者零售商之间缔结不同类型合约下的信息泄露问题。鉴于供应商与在位者之间具有较长期的合作关系,他们之间以收益共享合约进行交易,而考虑到进入者零售商新进入此市场,他与供应商之间以批发价格合约进行交易。基于信号博弈的研究框架,分析了此设定下所导致的纯策略完美贝叶斯均衡,并给出了分离均衡、混同均衡以及非泄露均衡出现的条件。研究发现,当供应商与在位者之间的收益共享比例和供应商向进入者提供的批发价格满足一定条件时,供应商有动机不泄露在位者的订货量信息,即出现非泄露均衡。最后,通过数值算例对在位者、进入者以及供应商在分离均衡和非泄露均衡中的利润进行了比较分析。

Information leakage is one of the barriers to information sharing among supply chain members. In this paper, we study information leakage issue within an upstream supplier and two competing downstream retailers- the incumbent and the entrant. Considering the long-term cooperative relationship between the supplier and the incumbent, we assume they are linked by a revenue sharing contract. Since the entrant just enters the market, the supplier offers him a wholesale price contract. By using signaling game framework, we analyze the pure strat- egy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this setting, and provide the conditions for separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium and non-leakage equilibrium. The study finds that the supplier has incentive to withhold the informa- tion from the incumbent if the revenue sharing rate and the wholesale price satisfy certain condition. Finally, we compare the incumbent, the entrant and the supplier＇ s equilibrium profits in separating and non-leakage equilib- rium via numerical examples.