公共支出的结构性特征与社会契约形式的转变:一个公共选择理论视角

The Structure of Public Expenditure and Transformation of Social Contract:A Perspective of Public Choice

社会契约的参与者对公共支出结构预期是否一致决定了社会契约的稳定性。本文以公共选择理论作为分析工具,从公共支出的角度构建了一个具有一般性的契约形式原则。任何的契约形式都必须符合契约的法定原则,收支对应原则和激励相容原则。从激励相容原则的预期一致性中区分出了霍布斯契约和洛克契约的具体形式,前者是以权威的方式形成预期一致性,后者是以协商的方式形成预期一致性。由此,讨论了社会契约对公共支出结构形成的规定,以及公共支出结构在对参与者构成利益扭曲的情况下所导致的契约改进。最后运用埃奇沃思交换对这样一种扭曲及其社会契约的改进做了一个经济学的分析。

With the public choice theory as an analytical method, this paper made a general principle of social contract form from the perspective of public expenditure, and found any social contract form must meet the statutory general principle of social contract, the principle of income - expenditure, and the principle of incentive compatibility. The detail of Hobbesian social contract and Locke social contract could be distinguished from expected consistency of the principle of incentive compatibility. The expected consistency in Hobbesian social contract formed in an authoritative way, and the expected consistency of Locke social contract came in a negotiated manner. Futhermore, this paper explored the nature that social contract formed the structure of public expenditure, and the improvement of contract in the case that structure of public expenditure distorted the interests of participants. Finally, an economic analysis was made in such distortions and improvements in social contract with the Etchworth exchange.