《新拆迁条例》下商业性拆迁突发事件的演化机理与影响因素

Evolutionary Mechanism and Influence Analysis of Commercial Demolition under the "New Demolition Ordinance"

《新拆迁条例》规范了房屋征收部门和房地产开发商、被征收入的拆迁补偿行为.运用演化博弈研究了城市商业性拆迁过程中开发商与被拆迁户之间行为特征,以及不同收益约束下各种均衡演化结果:开发商和被拆迁户均采取强硬策略导致群体性突发事件爆发;少数"钉子户"提出过分补偿要求迫使开发商接受;开发商采取暴力拆迁策略损害被拆迁户合法权益.进而讨论了政府部门提供外生性制度安排介入到城市商业性拆迁过程.政府部门在城市商业性拆迁事件中决策需要考虑多种因素的权衡.其中,逐步摆脱"土地财政"依赖,依法实施《新拆迁条例》禁止开发商的暴力拆迁行为,促使少数补偿标准期望值过高的"钉子户"回归理性态度,有利于双方达成理性双赢的(协商拆迁,让步同意)的演化均衡结果.

＂New Demolition Ordinance＂ regulates the behaviors of demolition and compen- sation among housing collection department, real estate developer and dismantled households. The paper applies evolutionary game theory to research the behavior characteristics between real estate developer and dismantled households in the course of city commercial demolition, and then to analyze the various ESS （Evolutionary Stable Strategy） results under the different constraints of payoff： firstly, both real estate developer and dismantled households take the tough strategy that results the demolition mass emergency; secondly, a few ＂nail households＂ put forward the excessive compensation requirements that forces real estate developers to ac- cept; thirdly, real estate developers take the forced relocation that damages the households＇ legitimate rights. Moreover, the paper discusses that government intervenes the course of city commercial demolition by providing exogenous institution. The decision making of local government in the course of urban commercial demolition needs to consider the weighting of multiple influences. Local government is gradually free from ＂land finance＂. The violent de- molition behavior taken by real estate developers is forbidden, and the too high expectations of compensation standard insisted by a few ＂nail households＂ is channeled according to the relative laws. So both real estate developers and dismantled households arrive at the rational strategies profile （Negotiate demolition, Concessions to agree）, which is the stable ESS state.