信息不对称、劳资议价与均衡工资决定

Information Asymmetry,Labor Bargaining and Equilibrium Wage Determination

本文通过构建劳动力市场工资议价模型,首次使用双边随机前沿分析方法和2005-2013年中国综合社会调查数据(CGSS),定量估算了劳资双方的议价能力对劳动力市场工资决定的影响效应。研究发现,议价能力因素对于劳动者的工资决定具有重要影响,企业凭借较强的议价能力将压低劳动者的平均工资水平5.46%左右。当前我国劳动力市场的工资决定机制对于高收入劳动者相对有利,但并不利于低收入劳动者的工资实现。尽管近年来政府推出一系列维护劳动者权益的法律法规和政策举措,但2005-2013年劳动者在劳资双方工资议价中的弱势地位并没有得到改变。同时,分组估计的结果表明,具有个体异质性以及不同收入水平的劳动者所受到的工资挤压程度不尽相同。

We construct a labor market wage bargaining model. And by using the bilateral stochastic frontier analysis method and the data of CGSS2005-2013 , we estimate the effects of bargaining power on the labor market. The results show that the bargaining power has an important impact on the workers＇ wage decision. Enterprises with strong bargaining power will depress the average wage level of workers around 5.46%.The wage determination mechanism of China＇ s labor market is relatively favorable for high income workers, but it is not beneficial to the realization of low income workers. Although the government introduced a series of laws to safeguard the rights of workers in recent years, but the weak bargaining position of workers has not been completely changed in 2005- 2013. Meanwhile, the degree of wage depression is different for workers with individual heterogeneity and different income levels.