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自然主义的“感觉经验”概念——以麦克道尔和莱特等人为例对自然化理论的探究

The Naturalistic Conception of Experience:Investigation on the Naturalistic Philosophy of Experience Proposed by McDowell and Wright
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摘要 麦克道尔的核心成果之一是他在《心灵与世界》一书中所阐发的经验论,该理论明确反对埃文斯的"非概念内容理论"。作为埃文斯理论的后继者,一部分哲学家认为麦克道尔的批判很大程度上是在重复塞拉斯和戴维森对"所与论"的抨击。因而,如果我们能够给出一种可以避免这种困境的理论,他的经验论就是不必要的。通过分析麦克道尔的反驳方案及其有效性,我们将会看到,在他对感觉经验的自然化构想中存在着严重的问题:经验内容的"不可分析性"预示着他的经验论思想并不是完备的,而这也就意味着他对NC的批判不可能具有彻底性。 One of McDowell's core achievements is his Empiricism presented in Mind and World, which explicitly opposes Evans~ theory of "Non - concep- tual Mental Content". As the successors of Evans, some philosophers believe that, to a great extent, McDowellg arguments is a repetition against "The Myth of the Given" which is presented by Sellars and Davidson. So, if we can develop a theory that can avoid this dilemma, his Empiricism is unnecessary. Through the analysis of Mcdowell's refutation, we will see that there are some serious problems in his conception of Experience : The Un - analyzability of Empirical Content indicates that his Empiricism is not adequate. This means that his criticism of "Non - conceptual Mental Content"cannot he adequate either.
作者 苏瑞
机构地区 南开大学哲学院
出处 《自然辩证法研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2017年第7期8-13,共6页 Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词 感觉经验 非概念内容 所与 信念 Experience Nonconceptual content the Given belief
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