知觉经验与知觉信念之第三条道路——基于戴维森与麦克道尔之争

The Third Way Between Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Belief: Based on the Disputation of Davidson and McDowell

知觉在哲学上的重要性毋庸置疑。那么心灵与世界之间究竟是一种什么关系?或者说知觉经验是否有命题内容?这是长期以来一直存有争议的问题。戴维森主张知觉经验不是命题态度,不具有命题内容,因此知觉经验不能为信念提供理由。而麦克道尔等人认为知觉有确定的命题内容,能够为信念提供理由。在分析二者理论的基础上,似乎我们还有第三条道路可选,即从功能上来解决知觉经验与信念之间的争议,那这第三条道路是否行得通呢?

Perception is certainly an importance issue in philosophy. Then what is the exactly relationship between mind and world？ Or does perceptual experience has any propositional content？ That is a long controversial issue. Davidson claims that perceptual experience is not propositional attitude, and it does not have any propositional content, so perceptual experience cannot be the reason for belief. But McDowell Et al. appear to think that perceptions do have proposition content, and there are able to provide reasons for belief. By analysis of the two philosopher＇s disputation, it seems that we have the third way which can functionally resolve the disputation between perceptual experience and perceptual belief, but the third way is available or not？