渐进利率市场化改革是否打破了“利率限制铁律”？--来自中国农户田野调查的证据

Does the Interest Rate Liberalization Reform Change“The Iron Law of Interest Rate Restriction”?

本文首先拓展了不对称信息条件下金融机构信贷决策的理论分析框架,提出了随着利率市场化的推进,农村金融机构边际信贷供给决策,是在利率提高所带来的风险补偿效应、借款人结构类型效应和信息不对称内生技术处理能力效应三者之间的权衡,并据此提出了利率市场化改革是否会打破在利率限制条件下,富裕农户会受益更多的"利率限制铁律"的假说。在此基础之上,利用田野调查的样本数据,本文的实证部分从机制与结论两个方面,对假说进行了经验验证。结果发现,农村利率市场化改革确实对打破"利率限制铁律"具有显著的作用,但是由于三种不同效应在利率市场化阶段的此消彼长,因此这一作用是动态和阶段性的。最后,论文提出应当阶段性地看待利率市场化改革的作用,以及强化农村金融市场的竞争具有重要的政策含义。

Based on a credit rationing model, we put forward a hypothesis -whether the interest rate liberalization reform has broke ＂the iron law of interest rate restriction＂ that means rich farmers benefit more under restricted interest rate. Then, in the empirical chapters, using the data from the field survey, we respectively test the hypothesis＇ s mechanisms and conclusions. The empirical results show that interest rate liberalization reform does have a significant role in breaking ＂the iron law of interest rate restriction＂ in rural areas, however, due to the shift of the three effects during the process of interest rate liberalization, this role is dynamic and periodical. Finally, this paper gives an important policy implication that it is very necessary to periodically look at the role of interest rate liberalization reform and to strengthen the competition in rural financial market.