经理人薪酬契约、技术创新与企业绩效

Executive compensation contract,technology innovation and corporate performance

经济新常态下,技术创新成为经济发展的关键驱动力。文章以2010-2013年A股上市公司为研究样本,采用广义最小二乘法就探索式技术创新、开发式技术创新对企业绩效的影响机理进行实证检验,并重点对经理人薪酬契约在技术创新投入与企业绩效关系中的治理效应及其治理范围进行了研究。研究结论显示:技术创新过程具有明显的动态性,创新投入并不必然带来企业绩效提升;经理人薪酬契约具有一定的局限性,其在开发式技术创新投入与企业绩效关系中发挥积极的治理效应,但对探索式技术创新行为经济后果的治理效应并不尽如人意。在探索式技术创新投入强度较大的情况下,高额的经理人货币化薪酬甚至会恶化企业绩效。

Under the new normal of economics, technology innovation has become a key driver of economic development. Taking the A - share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets as a research sample, this paper tested the technology in- novation influence mechanism on corporate performance and focused on the affected area and conditions of executive compensation contract particularly with the method of general least square. The results show that technology innovation process is dynamic, which does not necessarily improve corporate performance. Taking executive compensation contract as a moderator, further con- clusion revealed that executive compensation contract played a positive role on the relationship between exploitative technology in- novation and corporate performance. Unfortunately, we also found negative governance effect of executive compensation on the exploratory technology innovation economic consequence. General speaking, the governance effects of executive compensation contract are not satisfactory.