销售努力下的供应链多期权契约协调模型

Supply Chain Coordination under Multi-option Contract with Sales Effort Effects

针对需求随机且受到零售商努力因素影响的情况,研究由制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链的协调问题,其中制造商和分销商都可以向下游出售期权。首先用期权契约对供应链进行协调,发现在零售商独自承担努力成本情况下单纯的期权契约无法协调供应链;在期权契约的基础上引入努力成本共担契约后,发现当零售商与制造商的产品剩余价值满足两种特定的关系时,联合上述两种契约能使供应链得到协调,并且证明了通过设计合理的契约参数能够实现供应链整体收益在供应链成员之间分配,从而有助于改善企业在供应链中的行为决策能力和市场竞争能力。最后通过算例说明上述机制可以有效地协调并增加供应链各方的收益。

This paper studies the coordination problem of a supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributer and a retailer who faces a stochastic demand depending on sales effort. Among them, the manufacturer and distributor can sell options to downstream firms. First, we try to coordinate the supply chain with option contract, but find it cannot realize coordination when the effort cost is undertook only by retailer. So, besides the option contract, the paper introduces effort cost partaking contract, then we find that, when the salvage value of retailer and manufacturer meets two different relations, the two contracts above can realize the coordination of the supply chain, otherwise, we also prove that only if the contract parameters were set reasonable, the whole profit of supply chain can be distributed within all the members. At last, a case-analysis is given to prove the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism and the increase of profit of all members.