摘要
针对Grain-v1是否存在未知安全缺陷,提出了一种新的猜测确定攻击方法。利用内部状态转移特征和抽头位置关系,优先恢复其线性移位寄存器内部状态信息,并结合时间-存储-数据折中技术给出新的内部状态恢复攻击。结果表明:该攻击需要的数据复杂度为279bit密钥流,时间复杂度为286.3次算法加密,存储复杂度为280个160bit数据块。与已有的攻击方法相比,新攻击需要的时间复杂度更低。
With regard to the problem whether there are some unknown security flaws on Grain-v1, a new guess and deter- mine attack on Grain-vl is proposed, which is based on the approach of internal states transferring relations and tap post- dons, combined with the method of time-memory data tradeoffs. Additionally, the internal states of LFSR are recovered firstly, h is shown that this attack requires date complexity of about 279 bit keystream, time complexity of about 28〈a ticks Time complexity of this attack is more favorable than that of the known attacks.
出处
《桂林电子科技大学学报》
2017年第3期217-222,共6页
Journal of Guilin University of Electronic Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金(61572148)
广西自然科学基金(2015GXNSFGA139007)
广西高等学校优秀中青年骨干教师培养工程项目(第2期)
江苏省自然科学基金(BK20160543)