政治吸纳与执政地位——基于1946—2010年的跨国分析

Cooptation of Political Institutions and Durability of Authoritarian Regimes

政治吸纳被认为是权威主义政府执政地位长期保持的重要因素。以珍妮弗·甘迪为代表的学者讨论了议会吸纳的作用,认为制度化更强的议会吸纳会更有效地促进权威政府的保持。针对这一论点,作者首先对议会吸纳进行了重新编码以更有效地区分议会吸纳与政党吸纳的不同作用,并用1946—2010年253个权威政府的数据对议会吸纳和政党吸纳的作用进行了考察,模型结果表明,议会吸纳的作用是建立在政党吸纳基础上的,且非线性。在较弱的政党吸纳下,议会吸纳的作用并不显著;在较强的政党吸纳下,议会吸纳具有显著的正向作用,并且议会吸纳和政党吸纳间具有交互作用,随着政党吸纳制度化水平的提高,议会吸纳对执政地位保持的边际作用递增。因此,在执政地位保持上,议会吸纳需要在一定程度的政党吸纳上才会产生正向作用,并随着政党吸纳制度化水平的提高而不断增强。对尚未具备制度化执政党组织的权威政府而言,相比放开议会的进入限制,当前的要务是加强自身的执政党组织建设,通过更加制度化的政党吸纳来增加自身的力量。

Cooptation is regarded as the important factor to improve the durability of authoritarian regimes.Scholars,represented by Gandhi,discuss the effect of legislative cooptation from political institutions,and argue that legislative cooptation has the positive effect on durability of authoritarian regimes.Aiming at the viewpoint,this article examines the effect of legislative cooptation with statistical data of 254 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010.The result of models shows,the effect of legislative cooptation is not liner.On the condition of relatively weak cooptation of the ruling party,the effect of legislative cooption is not significant while on relatively strong cooptation of the ruling party the effect is significantly positive.Moreover,there is an interaction between legislative cooptation and cooptation of the ruling party,and the marginal effect of legislative cooption on durability of authoritarian regimes increases progressively along with the rising of the institutionalized level of cooptation of the ruling party.