“官出数字”:官员晋升激励下的GDP失真

“Officials Make the Statistics”: GDP Distortion Resulted from Officials' Promotion Motivation

中国地方统计数据的可靠性问题一直备受关注,然而由于缺乏科学有效的测度方法,尚未有研究实证检验其制度成因和背后逻辑。本文使用官方发布的实际城市生产总值相对于校准后城市夜间灯光亮度(DMSP/OLS)值的偏离程度来衡量中国城市GDP注水系数,并基于此研究了地方官员政治晋升周期下的GDP注水冲动。研究结果表明:(1)中国GDP注水系数在地区间存在较大差异,同时呈现空间上集中分布和时期间持续恶化的特征;(2)地方官员的政治晋升激励显著推高了中国城市的GDP注水系数,同时市委书记和市长的注水激励模式存在差异性;(3)随着任职年限的拉长,具有年龄优势市委书记的GDP注水激励逐渐强化,但是在第4年存在短暂下降现象;(4)城市GDP注水显著提高了市委书记的政治晋升概率,平均幅度达0.22%,但是对市长的晋升状况影响不显著。本文的研究对于掌握中国地方政府统计数据失真的现状、制度成因及其后果具有重要的实践意义。

Whether GDP is statistically distorted and to what extent has it been distorted have become hot issues in China. Due to the lack of a uniform estimation methodology, the empirical test remains largely unexplored on discovering the motivations that drive local governments to push GDP higher artificially. In this study, we construct the GDP distortion indicator by comparing the ratio between officially published GDP and the DMSP/OLS satellite data, and then examine the GDP distortion behaviors during the political promotion cycle. Our basic findings are： Firstly, GDP distortions vary considerately among regions, i.e., certain areas show larger magnitude of GDP distortions and the situation is worsening over time. Secondly, the political promotion motives of local officials have show great impact on distorting GDP, however, the effects of mayor＇s promotion motives differ significantly from that of secretaries of municipal party committees. Thirdly, the magnitude of secretaries＇ promotion motives impact grows larger as the tenure is extended. Whereas, it shows a little bit decrease at the fourth year in a whole political promotion cycle. Finally, the local officials could actually benefit by distorting GDP, especially for the secretaries of municipal party committees. As the GDP is distorted upward by 1%, the probability for the secretaries to be promoted will increase by 0.22%. However, these political rewards are not significant for the mayors. Our study has established an insight to look into the real GDP distortion status in China and provided explanations for the motivations of GDP distortions as well as the consequences of the ＂officials make the statistics＂.