投资现金流敏感性、代理问题与控制人持股效应

Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity,Agency Problems and Controller's Share Holdings Effects

基于投资现金流敏感性(ICS)视角,研究公司控制人持股的协同与壁垒效应。首先,通过Tobin Q和自由现金流两种标准证实代理问题是ICS产生的主要原因;然后,通过检验ICS与控制人持股份额之间的关系考察控制人持股效应。研究结论显示,ICS随控制人持股份额的增加而呈倒N型的变化趋势,说明控制人持股呈现出区间效应特征:当控制人持股份额在40%以下或50%以上时,呈现协同效应;当控制人持股份额在40%~50%时,呈现壁垒效应。

This article investigates the effects of the share holdings by a firm＇ s controller from a new perspective-Investment-Cash flow Sensitivity（ ICS）. It firstly provides the proofs that the ICS results from agency problems through tw o methods-Tobin＇Q and Free-Cash Flow methods. Then,on this basis,it studies the effects of the share holdings by the controller through observing the changes of ICS. The empirical results suggest that there is a reversed-N-shaped relationship betw een them. Specifically,there are alignment effects w hen the controller＇s ow nership is less than 40% or more than 50%,and there are entrenchment effects w hen the controller＇s ow nership is betw een 40% and 50%.