摘要
"特岗计划"是我国政府治理农村教育的一项重要教师政策。以山西省X县"特岗计划"政策执行为个案,从合作治理的角度探讨地方政府部门间的"共谋与博弈"问题。研究发现,权威体制下,"特岗计划"合作治理模式的执行控制过程并没有确保"合作与遵从"。一是存在市县两级政府间的超编"共谋",即权威体制与有效治理之间的矛盾。中央对于编制的权威控制致使地方政府面临"缺员"的实际问题而被迫只能采取欺骗、蒙蔽上级政府的"共谋"行为;二是地方政府府际间多元合作中,因"多龙治水",人社局、编办、财政局等部门自身权威和利益受到损害,府际间不能遵从政策和有效合作,存在碎片化行为。
Taking the administration of the “ Special-Post Teachers Plan” in X County, Shanxi Provinceas an example, the “collaboration and game playing” between local governments is explored from the angle ofcollaborative innovation.The studyfindsthat the collaborative-administration pattern of the “ Special-PostTeachers Plan” hasn * t been carried out in accordance with “ collaboration and compliance”. First, thereexists the overstaffing “ collaboration” between the municipal government and the county govthe compromise between the authoritative system and the effective administration. The orgthe cntral government leads to the probkm of “ understaffing” in the local governments, as a result, the local governments are forced to make the “ collaboration ” plan to cheat and fool the superior governments.Secondly,in the multivarate collaborations among the local governments, the sel-authorty and intehuman resources and social securty bureau, the commission rffice of public sectors reform and the bureau of Finance have been defied and infrnged, the local governments can not comply with the policies and collaborate effectively, and malignant fragmental behaviors have occurred due to the “ over-crowdeddepartments to superse the same matter”
出处
《教师发展研究》
2017年第2期37-44,共8页
Teacher Development Research
基金
山西基础教育质量提升协同创新中心规划课题"‘山西省乡村教师支持计划实施办法’政策执行研究"(XTC1615)
2016年山西省哲学社会科学规划课题"‘山西省乡村教师支持计划实施办法’政策跟踪与评估研究"
关键词
“特岗计划”
农村教育
地方政府
治理
共谋
博弈
“Special-Post Teachers Plan ”
rural education
local government - administration - collaboration
game playing