基于空间演化博弈的国有企业经理行为研究

Research on the Behavior of State-owned Enterprise Manager Based on Spatial Evolution Game

研究目的:现代企业制度是以所有权和经营权分离为基础的,由于所有人监督体制不完善,国有企业利益往往会受到代理人(国有企业经理)违规行为的威胁。本文将Agent和囚徒困境的重复博弈相结合,构建基于空间演化博弈的国有企业经理人行为演化模型,研究国有企业经理人的违规行为演化机理。通过模拟仿真激励措施、违章处罚、纪律检查对国有企业经理人行为的影响,发现如何监督、如何激励、如何惩罚国有企业经理人行为,以达到控制国有企业经理人违规行为的目的。研究结论:(1)国有企业经理人出现违规行为除当前激励措施单一之外,在很大程度上是自身原因造成的;当激励高时,经理人对激励不敏感,不会因为激励的提高而对其自身行为产生显著变化;(2)和纪检的严格性相比,国有企业经理人的行为更容易受到收入水平的影响,对国有企业经理人的处罚要根据当前的收入水平设置;(3)国有企业经理人的平均收入、守规努力工作的收入和国有企业经理人的违规行为比例呈负相关;经理人违规行为比例与违规失败收入具有负相关关系;(4)本研究结论对于控制国有企业经理人的违规行为具有一定的借鉴和指导意义。

Research purposes： The modem enterprise system is based on the separation of ownership and management. The interest of state - owned enterprise is often threatened by irregularities of agent （ state - owned enterprise manager） owing to incomplete oversight system. Combing Agent with Prisoner＇ s Dilemma repeated game, behavior evolution model of state - owned manager is established based on spatial evolution game to explore the mechanism of behavior evolution. It is expected to find how to supervise, how to stimulate and how to punish the behavior of state - owned manager by simulating penalty and discipline inspection impact on the behavior evolution of the state - owned managers. Research conclusions： （ 1 ） To a great extent, state - owned enterprise managers have irregularities owing to their own reasons in addition to a single incentive. Managers are not sensitive to the high incentive, neither will they change their behaviors dramatically with the increase of incentive. （2） Compared with harsh discipline, state - owned enterprise managers＂ behavior is more vulnerable to the influence of income level. State - owned enterprise managers should be punished according to their current income level. （3） The average income and the income of working hard are negatively related to violation violation failure. （4 proportion. The irregularity proportion of manager has a negative correlation with the income of ） The conclusion of this paper has guiding significance to control irregularities of manager of state - owned enterprise.