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后天伦理直觉主义可能吗——来自道德知觉理论的辩护及对其的反驳 被引量:2

Is A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism Possible:Justification from Moral Perception Theory and Its Objections
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摘要 后天伦理直觉主义者认为,我们的道德知识是知觉性的知识,它是通过我们的道德知觉所获得的,因此后天伦理直觉主义者试图通过回答"我们有道德知觉吗","我们能通过道德知觉获得道德知识吗","道德知觉是非推论性的吗",这三个问题来为自己辩护。但是反对者提出了因果性反驳和表征性反驳,对道德知觉理论带来了巨大的辩护困难。加上"无基之谈"和"循环困境"的挑战,后天伦理直觉主义者想要继续捍卫自己的观点,那么就必须提供更为令人信服的论证。 Aposteriori ethical intuitionists believe that our moral knowledge is the perceptive knowledge which is acquired by moral perception. So, Aposteriori ethical intuitionists attempt to answer the following questions to defend themselves: Do we have moral perception? Can we acquire moral knowledge by moral perception? Is moral perception non-inferential? However, opponents provide the causal objection and the representation objection to aposteriori ethical intuitionism, which bring great difficulties to justifications of the moral perception theory. Along with the no foundation objection and the circle objection, aposteriori ethical intuitionists have to make more convincing argument if they want to guarantee their standpoint.
作者 陈海 CHEN Hai(Department of Philosophy, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241, China)
出处 《上海交通大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2017年第4期70-77,共8页 Journal of Shanghai Jiao tong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金 2015年度国家社会科学基金重大项目"基于虚拟现实的实验研究对实验哲学的超越"(15ZDB016)
关键词 伦理直觉主义 后天伦理直觉主义 道德知觉 ethical intuitionists Aposteriori ethical intuitionists moral perception
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