价格串谋行为概率识别及审核决策

Research on Bid Rigging Probability of Bidders and Investigating Probability of the Legal Authority

在第一价格密封价格拍卖背景下,建立竞拍方与干预方间的四阶段序贯博弈模型,通过分析两者期望收益得到双方均衡策略。最后,进一步探讨均衡条件得到拍卖方的串谋概率以及干预方的审核概率。提供一种依据竞拍方的竞拍价格,以筛查竞拍方是否存在价格串谋行为的方法,为是否需要证明价格串谋的存在性提供依据。

We develop a four-stage sequential game between bidders and the legal authority in sealed-bid first-price auction, and obtain their equilibrium strategies by analyzing the expected payoffs, in order to obtain the probability of collusion of the bidders and the probability of investigation of the legal authority. The result provides the legal authority a way to screen whether the bidders are colluding or not, according to the bidding prices, and a basis to verify the existing of collusion.