私家车载客问题的进化博弈分析

Analysing of evolutionary game on credit venture of commercial banks facing individual

运用进化博弈理论建立私家车车主与出租车车主的进化博弈模型,得到各博弈方的复制动态方程,讨论各博弈主体在系统各种初始状态下的进化稳定策略。分析结果表明,在有限理性基础上,进化博弈的结果是令人满意的,因为私家车车主的进化稳定策略是不载客策略,所以,在管理部门的管制、出租车车主积极举报的双重作用下,私家车载客现象会消失,出租车客运市场可以正常运行。

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper builds private car owners and taxi owners evolutionary game model replicated dynamic equation of each player, and based on each player subject we discuss a variety of evolutionary stable strategy in the system in the initial state. The results show that, in the limited rationality based on evolutionary game theory, the result of evolutionary game is satisfactory, because the evolutionary stable strategy of private car owners is not to carry passengers. Therefore, under the control of the regulatory authorities, taxi owners to actively report the double effect, the phenomenon of private car passengers will disappear, the taxi passenger market can be normal operation.