工程质量政府监督的声誉激励机制

Reputation Incentive Mechanism of Government Supervision About Project Quality

建设工程产品交易特征和质量形成的特殊性决定了工程质量政府监督制度的社会价值。基于工程质量政府监督委托代理链框架结构,从完全信息和不完全信息两方面,构建工程质量监督的声誉动态博弈模型,由此导出固定监督人员"诚信"行为的条件,剖析声誉激励机制对于监督行为与有效性的推动效果;提出完善工程质量政府监督声誉激励机制和策略:完善工程质量监督诚信机制,健全质量监管人员评价激励,落实工程质量终身负责制,提高质量监督人员能力,以形成工程质量政府监督声誉基石,推动声誉激励建设,构建全面声誉网络,夯实声誉基础,加速声誉市场的建设,创造良好的声誉环境氛围,激励与惩罚并举,彰显工程质量政府监督违法成本的制约作用。

The trading characteristics of construction engineering products and the particularity of quality formation determine the social values of government supervision about project quality. Based on the principal-agent chain frame structure of project quality government supervision, building the reputation dynamic game model of government supervision about project quality from two aspects of complete information and incomplete information, the dynamic game model of quality supervision are built so as to exploring the condition of ＂ good faith＂ action of supervisory personnel and analyzed promoting effect of reputation incentive mechanism to the supervision behavior and the effectiveness; at last, government supervision over the quality engineering specification development suggestions are put forward： improving the honesty mechanism and the quality supervision staff incentive, carrying out the project quality lifelong responsibility system, improving the ability of quality supervisor, laying a solid reputation foundation, promoting the construction of reputation incentive, building a comprehensive reputation network, laying reputation foundation, speeding up the construction of market reputation, creating a good reputation environment atmosphere, rewards and punishments simultaneously, and revealing the restrictive effect of the project quality government supervision cost.