资产专用性、谈判实力与农业产业化组织利益分配——基于农民合作社的多案例研究

Asset Specificity,Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Interests in Agricultural industrialization Organizations:Multi-case Analysis Based on 16 Farmer Cooperatives

利益分配机制是维系农业产业化组织稳定发展的关键制度安排,也是保障农民收入的重要内容。由于"核心成员控制"是当前中国农业产业化组织中普遍存在的现象,大量研究均指出核心成员控制会导致普通成员利益被忽视。然而,现实情况却与理论分析不一致,存在着部分核心成员让利于普通成员的事例。为此,本文运用多案例比较分析方法,从资产专用性的角度对此现象进行了解释,分析结论表明:核心成员是否让利于普通成员取决于二者之间投入要素或产品的相对资产专用性程度;当一方投入要素或产品资产专用性越高时,对另一方的依赖性会增强,其谈判实力将减弱,因而在农业产业化组织分得的利益会越少。本文的研究为农业产业化组织分配制度的形成提供了一个"资产专用性—谈判实力—利益分配"分析框架。

The distribution of interests is the key to maintain the system stable development of the agricultural industrialization organization, but also to protect the farmers＇ income. The core member control in agricultural industrialization organizations is a common phenomenon, somestudy have emphasized the phenomenon that core members occupy the interests of ordinary members. There are a large number of cases that core members benefit to ordinary members. But the existing research has not given much attention to this phenomenon. Therefore, this paper explains this phenomenon through multi-case comparative analysis method. The conclusion of the study showed that whether core members benefit to ordinary members depends on asset specificity of inputs or product between each other. If one＇ s input or product of asset specificity is higher,which will harm one＇ sindependence on the other one and one＇ s bargaining power will be weakened, so the one will get less interests from the agricultural industrialization organization. The research of this paper also provides an analysis framework for the formation of the agricultural industrialization organization distribution system,which is ＂asset specificity, negotiation strength and interest distribution＂.