独立董事本地任职对上市公司违规行为之影响研究——基于政治关联与产权性质视角的经验证据

The Influence of Independent Directors' Local Tenure on Fraud of Listed Companies:Empirical Evidence Based on Political Connection and Property Rights

本文以本地任职为切入点,使用2007-2013年中国资本市场A股上市公司作为分析样本,考察独立董事本地任职对违规行为的影响及政治关联和产权性质在其中所发挥的作用。研究发现,独立董事本地任职降低了上市公司进行违规的倾向和严重程度。政治关联削弱了独立董事本地任职对违规行为的抑制功能,且上述调节作用在国有企业中显著下降。这表明本地任职提升了独立董事的监督效率,但这一作用发挥会受限于独立董事的政府背景和企业产权性质。由此提出在独立董事选聘过程中应充分重视本地任职所带来的积极作用,限制政治关联对独立董事职能履行的可能负面影响,并着重关注非国有企业的政治关联效应。

Using local tenure as breakthrough point and A-share listed companies in China＇ s capital market from 2007 to 2013 as analytical sample, this paper empirically tests the effect of independent directors＇ local tenure on corporate frauds and role of political connection and property rights in the process. We find that local independent directors decrease the likelihood of frauds and fraud severity in listed companies. Further study suggests that political connections weaken local independent directors＇ constraint on frauds and the moderating effect decreases significantly in SOEs （state-owned enterprises）. The results above indicate that local tenure can increase supervision efficiency, but the function is limited by governmental background of independent directors and the nature of property rights. According to the above findings, we should pay attention to positive function of local tenure, eliminating potential negative impaet of political connections and focusing on political connection effect in non-state-owned enterprises in the selection process of independent directors.