摘要
针对我国城市工业园区土地闲置或低效利用问题,基于土地发展权的视角,利用演化博弈理论,探析了不同情形下园区管委会和用地低效企业的演化稳定策略,并结合研究结论,分别从园区管委会反哺用地低效企业、诱导机制与逼迫机制相结合、土地使用权流转等方面提出政策建议。为了推动园区用地低效企业主动开展土地的再开发工作,政府需要加大制度创新力度,调动企业产权转型升级的主动性和积极性,放开园区土地二级市场,盘活存量闲置土地,诱导和逼迫低效企业开展土地再开发,提高我国城市工业园区土地再开发的效率。
For the issues of idle land or inefficient use of land in China' s urban industrial districts, the paper, from the perspective of land development rights, adopts the evolutionary game theory to explore the evolutionary stable strategies between the industrial district management committee and the enterprises with inefficient use of land. According to the research results, some policy suggestions are put forward from the perspectives of subsidi- zing the enterprises of inefficient land use by the industrial district management committee, the combination of induction and enforcement mechanism, and the transaction of land use rights. In order to promote the active land re-exploitation by those enterprises, the government is suggested to increase the system innovation, arouse the enterprises' initiative and enthusiasm for the transformation and upgrade of property rights, decontrol the second- ary market within the industrial districts, revitalize the idle land in stock and induce and enforce the low efficient enterprises to re-exploit the land resources so as to improve the efficiency of land re-exploitation in China' s ur- ban industrial districts.
出处
《海南大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2017年第4期60-66,共7页
Journal of Hainan University (Humanities & Social Sciences)
基金
海南省自然科学基金面上项目(20167251)
关键词
工业园区
工业用地
土地发展权
土地再开发
industrial district
industrial land
land development right
land re-exploitation