基于前景理论的水污染治理政企合谋监管

Supervise Management on Collusion between Government and Enterprise in Water Pollution Control Based on Prospect Theory

在生态补偿机制约束下,地方政府面临治理水污染、保护生态环境与支持地方企业、发展经济的两难困境。为了保障全流域的可持续发展,减少地方政府与企业在水污染治理中合谋行为,破解地方政府与企业的利益格局,构建了政企合谋的监管模型。该模型基于前景理论,充分考虑了水污染治理过程中地方政府、企业以及中央政府的心理特征,得到了对地方政府和排污企业合谋监管的均衡解。针对不同参数下的模型合谋条件进行讨论,辨别出合谋主体对名誉损失系数、惩罚系数以及厌恶损失系数等的敏感性。提出了需要加强对地方政府的监管力度,进行差异化监管以形成威慑心理效应,以及鼓励全社会监督等监管策略,来降低地方政府与企业合谋的概率,可以为水污染治理提供理论参考借鉴。

With the constraint of ecological compensation,the local government has the dilemma between controlling water pollution and developing the economy.In order to ensure the sustainable development of river basin,and to reduce the collusion between the local government and enterprise,the supervise model is established.Based on the prospect theory,the model considers the psychological characteristics of local and central government,enterprises.The equilibrium solution of the collusion between local government and enterprise has been got.The collusion conditions under different parameters are discussed,and the sensitivity of punishment and loss aversion coefficient are identified.Some suggestions such as strengthening the supervision of local government,making different controlling and encouraging the whole society to supervise were put forward,which can reduce the probability of collusion,and provide the theoretical reference for water pollution control and ecological compensation.