环境污染群体性事件误对策演化博弈分析:基于大连PX事件的案例

Hypergame Evolutionary Analysis of Mass Emergency Derived from Environmental Pollution:Based on the Case of Dalian PX Event

在环境污染群体性突发事件的发生演化和应急处置过程中,博弈双方存在信息不对称与认知差异,误对策方法提供了合适的分析框架。本文运用误对策分析方法剖析了环境污染群体性事件中化工企业与周边居民的认知差异,分别建立了博弈双方的误对策博弈模型,其中包括具有"搭便车"行为的周边居民误对策博弈模型,具有"欺骗"行为的化工企业误对策博弈模型,并结合大连福佳大化PX事件分析了博弈双方存在认知差异的演化稳定性,分别对地方政府、化工企业与周边居民给出了相关政策建议。

During the evolutionary course and emergency management of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution,both players have the information asymmetry and cognitive difference,so hypergame analysis provides a suitable analytic framework.This paper applies the hypergame analysis method to the cognitive difference in environmental pollution event between the chemical companies and the surrounding residents,builds the hypergame models of the both players,respectively,including the surrounding residents＇ hypergame model with a＂free rider＂behavior,the chemical companies＇ hypergame model with a ＂cheat＂ behavior.And combining with Dalian Fujia PX event,the paper analyses the both players＇ evolutionary stability with cognitive differences.The result shows that,the surrounding residents with＂free rider＂behavior will evolve into a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium point（peace demands,continue to produce）,and as the chemical companies with＂cheat＂behavior only exist mixed strategy equilibrium,and forms a mixed equilibrium point as the center of the evolution of the state of limit cycles,making the both players into a＂cat and mouse＂game.The hypergame evolutionary results under both cognitive differences together cause the Dalian PX event long-term,complex trends.And in order to avoid the deterioration of mass emergency derived from environmental pollution,this paper gives some relevant policy proposals for the local government,the chemical companies and the surrounding residents,respectively.