我国流域横向生态补偿机制的制度经济学分析

The Institutional Economics Analysis of the Horizontal Ecological Compensation in Basin of China

本文结合近期案例,分析我国的流域横向生态补偿试点在科斯范式基础上结合中国国情进行的制度创新。当上下游的博弈难以同时满足参与约束和激励相容约束时,合约中引入了纵向补偿来填平双方的"价格"鸿沟,形成了"纵横"交织的嵌套式合约;以奖罚并举的双向补偿来化解上下游的"产权"争议;借助中央政府的支持和地方政府的环保"锦标赛"机制克服了科斯定理对交易成本过度敏感的难题。最后,本文针对横向生态补偿试点中存在的问题提出了若干政策建议。

Combined with the recent case, this paper analyzed the institutional innovation of horizontal ecological compensation pilot projects in river basin of China based on the Coase theorem. When the bargaining between upstream and downstream cannot meet the requirements of the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, the longitudinal compensation was introduced into the contract to fill the price gap, forming a ＂crisscrossed＂ nested contract. This contract with bidirectional ecological compensation of reward and punishment is able to resolve disputes between upstream and downstream; and overcome the problem that the Coase theorem is overly sensitive to transaction cost on the support of the central government and the environmental protection ＇championships＇ between the local governments. Finally, this paper put forward some policy suggestions on the problems of horizontal ecological compensation pilot projects.