摘要
我国证券市场在制度设计和市场环境等方面存在的缺陷 ,使得上市资格成为稀缺资源。大量企业上市后经营业绩下滑 ,为了保住上市资格和配股资格 ,具有利用关联重组手段操纵利润的动机。重组公司净资产收益率的分布情况和非经营利润比例的变化情况表明 ,在关联重组中确实存在着利润操纵现象。应当加强对关联公司重组的监管 ,打击利用重组操纵利润的行为。
Limitations in system design and market environment of China's securities market have led to the scarce qualification of quoted companies.In order to maintain their qualification in the situation of declined business,many companies have been proved to manipulate profit in related restructuring.Therefore supervision should be enforced to avoid this illegal practice
出处
《东南大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
北大核心
2002年第4期18-23,共6页
Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science)
