异常性的概念阐明与副现象论之诬——基于戴维森的反形而上学立场的再审视

Conceptual Formulation of Anomaly and Charge of Epiphenomenalism——Re-examination of the Stance of Davidson's Anti-metaphysics

苏格拉底式的心灵探究充斥着种种不经之论和不当的概念预设,滋生了僵硬、枯寂的心灵观,妨害了对心灵之本质的合理说明。戴维森认为只有变革心灵认知方法,赋予心灵以异常性,树立动态而富有弹性的新型心灵观,使之一致和融贯于现有的自然科学知识整体,镜喻思维才有望打破,心灵在物理世界中的地位才能得到妥善安置。面对异常一元论所陷入的类型副现象论的责难,戴维森强调他那反形而上学立场没有被很好地领会,以至于其四对区分被忽视,即事件的形而上学和认识论区分与事件个例和事件类型区分;因果规律和因果规则区分以及高阶属性对低阶属性的本体论依赖与因果依赖区分,结果造成了无谓的语词争论。

The approach of Socratic investigation of mind contains theories uncensored and inappropriate conceptual presuppositions and is not good in accounting for the nature of mind, resulting in rigid and static view of mind. It is suggested that the mirror metaphor model of thinking is to be deprived of to make it possible to find a good place in the physical world for mind only if the concept of anomaly is introduced to help establishing a flexible and dynamic view of mind coherent and consistent with the overall advancements of current scientific knowledge. On the charge that anomalous monism has fallen into type epiphenomenalism, Davidson reclaims that critics fail to grasp his philosophical style of anti-metaphysics, causing such four couple of important distinctions of individual events neglected as metaphysics and epistemology of event, event particulars and event type, causal laws and causal regularities, ontological dependence and causal dependence of higher properties on lower properties, leading to some verbally meaningless debates.