恶性竞争的触发及约束机制研究——基于“3Q大战”的案例

Research on Trigger and Discipline Mechanisms in Cutthroat Competition——The Case Study of Tencent-Qihoo 360 Spat

迄今,学术界鲜有关注频繁出现的企业间非价格战形式的恶性竞争现象。本文首次对此进行了界定,并在Hoteling空间模型下对恶性竞争的触发及约束机制进行理论分析。理论模型显示,同质化竞争是恶性竞争的触发机制,而声誉机制、行政(司法)处罚以及行业管制则为约束机制,能对恶性竞争的主导企业产生惩戒效果。随后,本文以"3Q大战"案例进行实证检验,研究发现,互联网行业内严重的同质化竞争触发了恶性竞争,并使腾讯遭受较大的声誉惩戒,但行政处罚及行业管制尚不具备有效的约束作用。鉴于此,本文认为,进一步加强企业创新、提倡合作竞争,并完善法律及行政监管环境将有助于抑制恶性竞争。

In China, the cutthroat competition is almost ubiquitous in all industries, culminating in year 2010. With the development of the internet, new forms of competitions among enterprises appear, such as non-preda- tory pricing competition （exclusive dealing） in the internet field, in which the enterprises holding the advantage stipulate that its trading partners cannot deal with others except dominant enterprises. One of the most sensational non-undercutting competition case is that Tencent refused to provide software service to users who use 360 simulta- neously in year 2010. So far in literature, there is little attention to the non-undercutting cutthroat competition, and the definition of cutthroat competition is still controversial. The mainstream view of cutthroat competition is narrower, which simplifies that enterprises begin to set price below the marginal cost （namely, undercutting）. Since little is known about the trigger and discipline mechanisms about cutthroat competition, this paper focuses on these two issues. Within our knowledge, this study is the first to define non-undercutting cutthroat competition, and is also the first to analyze the trigger and discipline mechanisms under Hotelling spatial model. Moreover, empirical tests are extensively conducted using the case of Teneent-Qihoo 360 spat. The theoretical analyses show that homogenized competition is the trigger factor of cutthroat competition, and that the reputation-based discipline, administrative punishment and regulation constitute the disciplinary factors, which may cause economic consequences. When the purchase cost is vital to consumers, all product differentiation between enterprises is trivial, or the cost of cutthroat competition is high, enterprises tend to bear the loss from cut- throat competition. Our empirical case of Tencent-Qihoo 360 spat shows that cutthroat competition brings losses to Tencent, contra- ry to its starting target. The losses are mainly on reputation damage , instead of administrative punishment and tight- ened regulations. The paper finds that homogenization of competition in the internet indus petition-QQ computer housekeeper that are extremely similar in terms and 360 security guards of functions and interface represents the core products try triggered cutthroat com- of Tencent and Qihoo 360 features. The event study analysis shows that market re- action of Tencent is strongly negative around cutthroat competition and the cumulative abnormal returns in the event window （0,5） is -8. 18%. However, the market reaction of Tencent is extremely weak around the mediation tim- ing by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology（MIIT）. It is also weak for market reaction of firms in in- ternet industry when MIIT issues policy for stronger regulations. Therefore, we infer that the current administrative punishment or the regulations of the industry is not as effective as expected in restraining cutthroat competition. The findings of this paper suggest that the following measures are effective to restrain cutthroat competition： first, to guide enterprises to innovate on products and technologies;second, to advocate open and cooperative compe- tition; and third, to raise the institutional costs of cutthroat competition.