摘要
【目的/意义】大数据时代,如何实现对企业竞争情报人员的激励,维持较高的工作绩效,成为企业管理中亟待解决的问题。【方法/过程】对企业竞争情报人员的激励不仅体现在合约层面-硬约束,且亦应重视其心理契约-软约束,正是心理契约的存在,人们才能接受不完全合约的缺陷。基于此,将软约束纳入到激励机制研究之中,重新设计委托代理模型,求解委托代理关系双方最大效用。【结果/结论】研究发现,具有敬业特质的竞争情报人员会给企业带来更多收益,也更关注隐性激励。因此,管理者对其应采用精神激励为主的策略。
[Purpose/significance] In the era of large data, how to realize the incentive of the enterprise's competitive intelligence personnels and maintain the high performance is the urgent problem to be solved in the enterprise management. [Method/process] The incentive of enterprise competitive intelligence personnels is not only reflected in the contract level- hard constraints, but also should pay attention to the psychological contract- soft constraints, it is the existence of psychological contract that people can accept the defects of incomplete contracts. Based on this, the soft constraints are introduced into the incentive mechanism research, redesign the principal-agent model, and solve the maximum utility of the principal-agent relationship between the two sides. [Result/conclusion] The study finds that the competitive intelligence personnels with professional characteristics will bring more benefits to enterprises and also pay more attention to hidden incentive. Therefore, managers should use the the spirit incentive strategy mainly.
作者
李宝虹
杨雨艨
LI Bao-hong YANG Yu-meng(School of Management, Harbin Normal University, Harbin 150025, China School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology R&D Center, Beijing 100076,China)
出处
《情报科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第8期47-50,共4页
Information Science
基金
国家社会科学基金研究项目(16BJY078)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJA870003)
黑龙江省软科学项目(GC16D102)
哈尔滨师范大学青年学术骨干支持计划项目(SG2011-03)
关键词
企业竞争情报人员
激励机制
大数据
competitive intelligence professionals
static incentive mechanism
big date