性善:本善与向善——孟子性善论的两种诠释进路及其当代省察

The Good of Human Nature:Good Inherent and Good-oriented——A Debate and Reflection on Two Interpretations of the Good of Human Nature of Mencius

孟子性善论的本善论诠释与向善论诠释之间存在着深刻的差异性。前者是在本体论视域下言说孟子的性善论,而后者立论的根基则是＂事实＂与＂价值＂的二分。本善论诠释的理论缺陷在于其形而上的先验化诉求所导致的对生活世界中的本源性实存经验的褫夺及其对人的本真能在的遮蔽;而向善论诠释则由于过分注重经验性的内容一方面无法给予道德失败以合理说明,另一方面则是斩断了孟子性善论所蕴含的＂亲—民—物＂之间的存在论意义上的连续性。＂恻隐之心＂作为本源情感是对天地万物一体共在的本真领会。孟子性善论的真实意涵既非论证人之为人的先验善性,亦非指明生命的事实是经验性的向善过程,而是在本源情感与本真领会的基础之上提供一种指引性的哲学,进而开启一种不断超越自身旧有主体性的＂性善＂之路。

The two interpretations—Good inherent and Good-oriented—of the Good of Human Nature of Mencius are of great differences.The'Good inherent'expresses the Good of Human Nature of Mencius from the perspective of Ontology;and the premise of the'Good-oriented'is the discrimination of fact from value.The theoretical defect of'Good inherent'is the ignorance of the existential experience in the life world and the veil of the real becoming of human beings.The'Good-oriented'can not give a reasonable explanation on the moral failure and ignores the ontological thinking of Mencius.The ture meaning of the Good of Human Nature of Mencius is not to testify transcendental goodness of huaman nature,and also not to clarify that the process of life is empirically tending toward goodness.The ture meaning of the Good of Human Nature of Mencius is to open the road of transcending the old subjectivity and becoming goodness which is based on the original emotion.