领导干部自然资源资产离任审计演化分析

Analysis of Audit of Outgoing Leading Officials' Natural Resources Accountability

在环境治理过程是中央政府和地方政府之间存在利益博弈。本文通过构建演化博弈模型,分析了不完全信息条件下,中央政府和地方政府在环境治理中的动态博弈过程。在此基础上,构建基于前景理论的博弈模型,分析领导干部自然资源资产离任审计对地方政府环境治理行为的影响。研究表明:风险决策中有限理性决策者的风险偏好性使得中央政府和地方政府在环境治理博弈中的纳什均衡,即中央"不重视"、地方"不治理";领导干部自然资源资产离任审计会使得更多的地方政府演化为风险规避者;通过实施领导干部自然资源资产离任审计,强化地方政府的环境治理责任,加大对地方政府环境治理不力的查处力度、增加处罚强度将会改变地方政府在环境治理中的策略选择,进而有望破解环境治理失灵难题。

Environmental governance is an interest game between local governments and central government. By building an evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the dynamic game process between local governments and central government during the environmental governance under incomplete information condition. Based on prospect theory, the paper builds a game model and analyzes the influence of audit of outgoing leading officials＇ natural re- sources accountability on local government＇s activities. The results show that in risk decisions, the risk appetite of bounded rational decision makers will have Nash Equilibrium between central and local governments： the central government ＂does not care＂, and the local governments ＂do not implement＂ ; the audit of outgoing leading offi- cials＇ natural resources accountability will drive more local governments to avoid risks ; through the audit of outgo- ing leading officials＇ natural resources accountability, the local government＇s environmental accountability will be strengthened, and tougher law enforcement and sterner punishment on local government＇s activities of pollution will change the choice of strategy in their environmental governance, so as to prevent the absence of governmental gov- ernance.