基于系统动力学的流动人口医保关系转接问题博弈分析

Game Analysis of Transferring Medical Insurance of Floating Population Based on Systematic Dynamics Models

目的:对流动人口医保转接问题进行定性定量研究,为完善医保转接政策提供参考。方法:基于博弈论思想,对流动人口、企业、政府三者的利益争夺展开博弈分析。在此基础上,结合系统动力学原理,构建政府与企业博弈的系统动力学模型,并展开相关预测分析。结果:流动人口作为弱势集团,其医保权益的实现由企业和政府博弈结果所决定;不转接医保的企业数量与对企业罚款额度成反比,与政府查处费用和企业医保转接成本成正比。结论:政府作为实现流动人口与企业博弈均衡的关键点,必须加强对违法企业查处力度,提高行政办事效率,努力降低监督检查费用,减轻企业转接医保关系的经济负担,勇于承担应尽之责。

Objective To qualitatively and quantitatively study the issues of transferring medical insurance of floating popula- tion, and provide references for improving health policy. Methods Based on analysis of game among the floating population, com- pany and government, the system dynamics model of game between the government and company was established to predict it. Re- sults As a disadvantaged group of floating population, their rights to healthcare depend on the outcome of the games between the government and company. The number of companies refused to transfer medical of floating population was inversely proportional to the penalty on them, and in direct proportion to cost of supervision and business. Conclusion As a key point of game equilibrium between the floating population and company, the government must strengthen supervision on the illegal companies, improve ad- ministrative efficiency, and reduce the company＇ s economy burden for transferring medical insurance of floating population.