摘要
假定网购平台的利润受买卖双方群体规模、在线卖方的注册费以及网购平台对在线卖方的质量监控成本的影响,在此前提下,建立了数学规划模型。研究得出,由于网购平台所处的双边市场环境虽然具有质量中介的功能,但不会完全为消费者把好诚信关;并指出网购平台的质量诚信监控行为与在线买方的网络外部性、在线买方对非诚信卖家的容忍度、网购平台的质量诚信监控成本、非诚信卖方的伪装成本、在线买方的质量效应等要素密切相关。
This paper assumes that profits of online shopping platform affected by the buyer and the seller group size, online seller＇s registration fee and the platform＇s cost of quality integrity control. Under this assumption, it draw a conclusion that online shopping platform not completely guard a pass for the consumer, Although it has the function of the quality of intermediary, because it is in two-sided markets environment. It also finds that the quality integrity control behavior of online shopping platform is closely related to online buyer＇s network externalities, tolerance of online buyer＇s to dishonest seller, platform＇s cost of quality integrity control, dishonest seller＇s disguise cost and the quality effect of the online buyer.
作者
李乃文
荣帅
赵宏霞
LI Nai-wen RONG Shuai ZHAO Hong-xia(College of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105 School of Management, Bohai University, Jinzhou 121013)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第8期129-133,138,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71201012
71502017)
关键词
网购平台
在线卖方
质量诚信
双边市场
交叉外部性
online shopping platform
online sellers
quality integrity
two-sided markets
network externalities
