地方官员特征与公共支出

Local officials and social expenditure

地方政府治理特别是地方官员的治理是影响我国经济社会发展的关键要素之一。通过刻画市委书记的选拔来源,深入探讨地方官员特征对公共支出的影响,结果发现本地提拔的市委书记会显著减少当地中小学教师人数、扩大建筑业产值并增加实铺道路面积,这个结论与官员的天然感情因素和本地知识无关。有市长经历的市委书记会显著减少科教支出比例和中小学教师人数,在城乡差距不断扩大的情况下本地晋升的市委书记会增加中小学教师人数但也会减少环境治理投资额。用Wild聚类自助t统计量进行稳健性检验,发现这一结论依然显著。为此应该自上而下设计多元化、动态的官员考核机制,这样本地提拔的官员才会真正增加民众福利,同时也体现出我国地方治理的优越性。

Local governance is key to understand the development of China. In this paper,through describing the origins of party secretary,we find that local promotion of party secretary significantly reduces the number of teachers in primary and secondary school,expands the output of the construction industry and increases the road area,and this conclusion has nothing to do with natural feelings and local knowledge. The municipal party secretary who is promoted from local mayors leads a significant reduction in the proportion of science and education expenditure and the number of teachers. With the sharply expansion of urban-rural gaps,local promotion will increase the number of teachers in primary and secondary school but reduce the amount of environmental management investment. It is found that the conclusion of this paper is still significant by using the Wild clustered t statistic. A policy proposal for this article is to design a top-to-bottom,diversified,dynamic official assessment mechanism,so that local promotion will increase the welfare of the people and show the advantages of local governance.